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Quantum coin tossing (QCT) is an important primitive of quantum cryptography and has received
continuous interest. However, in practical QCT, Bob’s detectors can be subjected to detector-side
channel attacks launched by dishonest Alice, which will possibly make the protocol completely inse-
cure. Here, we report a simple strategy of a detector-blinding attack based on a recent experiment.
To remove all the detector side-channels, we present a solution of measurement-device-independent
QCT (MDI-QCT). This method is similar to the idea of MDI quantum key distribution (QKD).
MDI-QCT is loss-tolerant with single-photon sources and has the same bias as the original loss-
tolerant QCT under a coherent attack. Moreover, it provides the potential advantage of doubling
the secure distance for some special case. Finally, MDI-QCT can also be modified to fit the weak
coherent state sources. Thus, based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our proposal
can be implemented easily.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum coin tossing (QCT) allows two spatially sep-
arated mistrustful parties, e.g., Alice and Bob, to gen-
erate a common random bit via a quantum channel. It
is the quantum counterpart of classical coin tossing first
introduced by Blum [1] in 1981. QCT can be used as
a primitive in many applications, such as secure multi-
party computation.
According to whether the parties have preferences on
the coin’s output, coin tossing (CT) can be divided into
two classes: weak CT (WCT) and strong CT (SCT). In
WCT, the parties have opposite preferences for the coin’s
outcome, resulting in a winner and a loser. However, in
SCT, each party’s desired outcome is random. In this
paper, we only refer to SCT unless otherwise noted.
The security of a QCT protocol involves three require-
ments: (1) If both Alice and Bob are honest, the proba-
bilities of the coin’s outcome x ∈ {0, 1} are Pr[x = 0] =
Pr[x = 1] = 12 . Thus, the protocol is called correct.
(2) If Alice is dishonest and Bob is honest, the maxi-
mal probability that Alice can bias the outcome of x is
PrA[x] =
1
2 + εA. (3) If Bob is dishonest and Alice is
honest, the maximal probability that Bob can bias the
outcome of x is PrB[x] =
1
2 + εB. The bias of the pro-
tocol is defined as ε = max{εA, εB}, and the protocol is
called fair if εA = εB. The bias of an ideal QCT is 0.
The seminal QCT protocol was investigated by Ben-
nett and Brassard in their 1984 paper [2], henceforth
referred to as BB84 QCT. Unfortunately, as argued in
[2] and the following Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) [3–5] no-
go theorem, an unconditionally secure ideal QCT is im-
possible. However, this is not the end of the story.
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Based on the laws of quantum mechanics, QCT can
achieve a maximal cheating probability lower than 1,
which is impossible for any non-relativistic classical coin
tossing unless unproven computational assumptions are
made. Aharonov et al. [6] and their followers [7–11] in-
deed showed bit-commitment-based QCT protocols with
ε < 12 and achieved a temporary lower bound ε =
1
4 .
Meanwhile, Kitaev [12] proved that any fair QCT proto-
col cannot achieve a bias less than 1√
2
− 12 ≈ 0.207. Later,
the gap was closed by Chailloux and Kerenidis [13], who
proposed a protocol with a bias arbitrarily close to 1√
2
− 12
based on the possibility of quantum WCT [14, 15].
A major flaw of the above protocols is that they only
consider the perfect case. The security may be com-
pletely broken if the imperfections of practical systems
are taken into account. To bridge the gap between the-
ory and practice, several countermeasures against these
imperfections have been developed. To address the
problem of noise, the primitive of string coin tossing
[16, 17] was considered. Ha¨nggi and Wullschleger [18]
proposed that the honest players would abort with a
certain probability depending on the noise level. Re-
cently, a nested-structure framework is presented for
single-short QCT and partial noise-tolerant property is
achieved [19]. Another notorious problem in long dis-
tance quantum cryptography is losses, which make the
early two QCT experiments [20, 21] completely insecure.
The earlier protocols in, for instance, Refs. [6, 7], also
could not tolerate losses because of the sending noth-
ing attack [22] or the unambiguous discrimination (UD)
and maximal-confidence discrimination (MCD) of non-
orthogonal states attack[23]. A breakthrough was made
by Berlin et al. [22], who proposed a loss-tolerant QCT
protocol that is completely impervious to loss of quantum
states with single-photon source. We will refer to it as the
BBBG09 protocol. Subsequently, BBBG09 was imple-
mented with an entangled source because the protocol is
2insecure in the presence of multi-photon pulses [24]. Re-
cently, by fixing the number of emitted pulses, hence lim-
iting the probabilities of the multi-photon pulses, Pappa
et al. [25] made the weak coherent state source applica-
ble to the loss-tolerant protocol. However, the protocol
of Pappa et al. (referred to in the following as PCDK11
protocol) is not completely loss-tolerant. Thus, there is
an upper bound of the amount of tolerated losses if one
wants to achieve a security better than that of classi-
cal protocols. The PCDK11 protocol was implemented
based on a commercial plug-and-play scheme designed
for quantum key distribution (QKD) with several modi-
fications [26], considering all the standard realistic imper-
fections. The biases of the experiments in [24] and [26]
are both approximately 0.4, and they achieve distances of
10m and 15km, respectively, wherein the maximal cheat-
ing probabilities are strictly lower than those classically
possible.
Apart from the standard realistic imperfections, Pappa
et al. also examined how a few prevalent side channel
loopholes in practical QKD affected the security of practi-
cal QCT. Although not all the attacks are effective, there
remain some powerful detector-side channel attacks, e.g.,
detector-blinding attack, being defended. The principle
of the detector-blinding attack on the plug-and-play QCT
is as follows. First, a malicious Alice blinds Bob’s de-
tector, as what the eavesdropper does in the detector-
blinding attack on QKD [27], and sends a honest state to
Bob. Consequently, Alice can correlate her basis choice
with Bob’s successful detections. Then, Alice can declare
any state she has sent to Bob according to Bob’s random
bit value and her desired coin’s outcome. In this way, Al-
ice has complete control over the coin’s outcome without
being detected as cheating, i.e., εA =
1
2 .
To remove all the known and unknown detector-side
channel attacks launched by Alice in practical QCT
systems, we propose a measurement-device-independent
QCT (MDI-QCT) protocol based on BBBG09, which
benefits from the idea of MDI-QKD [28, 29]. In MDI-
QKD, each of the two legitimate parties sends one of the
four BB84 photon states randomly to a third party, which
may be the eavesdropper. The third party projects the
incoming photons into a Bell state and announces the
measurement result. After repeating this many times,
these Bell state results can be used by the two legitimate
parties to estimate the degree of eavesdropping in the
post-processing. The advantage of MDI-QKD is that the
legitimate parties only need to characterize their state
preparations and they do not need to hold a measure-
ment device anymore. Thus, the measurement device
can be viewed as a black box and it naturally removes all
the detector side-channels. The concept of MDI-QCT is
similar to MDI-QKD in that Alice and Bob only need to
know their state preparation processes and Bob does not
have to trust his measurement device. That is to say,
Bob can treat his measurement device as a black box
and just obtain a Bell state outcome from it. Combining
this with his and Alice’s announced states, Bob can esti-
mate whether Alice is cheating with a non-vanishing (but
non-unit) probability. Thus, what would protect against
the eavesdropper’s attacks in MDI-QKD, is now argued
to protect against dishonest Alice’s detector-side channel
attacks. Adapting MDI paradigm in QCT is not a quite
easy issue, since Alice and Bob in QCT are mistrustful,
while they are trustworthy in QKD. Note that the un-
trusted measurement device now is in Bob’s laboratory,
which is also different from MDI-QKD. We emphasize
that Bob should shield his source for preventing both Al-
ice and the untrusted measurement device from knowing
the classical information about his state preparation.
In the follow of this paper, we first describe the proto-
col when each party uses a single-photon source in Sec-
tion II, and give its security analysis in section III. Spe-
cially, in the security against a dishonest Alice, we an-
alyze an individual attack and a coherent attack. The
coherent attack comes from the conclusion of the semi-
nal work of Ref. [8]. At last, we will show the protocol is
also suitable for weak coherent state source with a subtle
modification.
II. PROTOCOL FOR MDI-QCT
For a QCT protocol to be partial security and prac-
ticality, there are two aspects that should be considered
seriously. In theory, the protocol must circumvent the
MLC no go theorem. In practice, the protocol ought to
resist against the attacks due to losses. To solve these
two critical problems, BBBG09 takes the BB84 template
and the states in the protocol of Aharonov et al. [6],
known as ATVY states |φα,a〉:
|φα,0〉 = √y|0〉+ (−1)α
√
1− y|1〉,
|φα,1〉 =
√
1− y|0〉 − (−1)α√y|1〉,
where y ∈ (12 , 1), which will be adjusted to make the
protocol fair. Traditionally, α is the basis and a is the
bit.
In BBBG09, Alice partially commits either a = 0
or a = 1 to Bob. Thus, the density matrices ρ0 =
1
2 |φ0,0〉〈φ0,0| + 12 |φ1,0〉〈φ1,0| and ρ1 = 12 |φ0,1〉〈φ0,1| +
1
2 |φ1,1〉〈φ1,1| that correspond to Alice’s partial commit-
ments are distinct, which implies that the MLC no go
theorem does not apply here. Moreover, Bob cannot
through the UD or MCD to obtain a better discrimina-
tion of ρ0 and ρ1 than the minimum-error discrimination
(MED). This is the key that, in BBBG09, Alice can re-
send the states at once if Bob’s measurement fails and
the protocol is loss-tolerant with single-photon source.
Note that BBBG09 protocol can work with an entan-
gled source [24]. Therefore, to remove all the detector-
side channel attacks launched by Alice, like MDI-QKD,
we can implement the entanglement-based BBBG09 pro-
tocol in a time-reversal way and obtain the MDI-QCT.
The key ingredients in MDI-QCT is the same with
BBBG09, where BB84 template and ATVY states are
3employed. The mainly difference is that Bob will not
have to trust his measurement devices via a Bell state
measurement (BSM). Bob neither needs to fully charac-
terize the BSM, nor protect it from unwanted leakage
of classical information to the outside. The only clas-
sical information that Bob should protect from leakage
to the untrusted measurement device and Alice is of his
state preparation. First, let us show a simple example of
our MDI-QCT protocol, where each party uses a single-
photon source for the aim of completely tolerating losses.
Protocol: MDI-QCT—
1. Alice picks, uniformly at random, a basis α ∈ {0, 1}
and a bit a ∈ {0, 1}. She then prepares the polarization
ATVY state |φα,a〉, i.e.,
|φα,0〉 = √y|H〉+ (−1)α
√
1− y|V 〉,
|φα,1〉 =
√
1− y|H〉 − (−1)α√y|V 〉,
(1)
where |H〉 and |V 〉 represent the horizontal and vertical
polarization states, respectively, and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob prepares the state |φβ,b〉 (β ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ {0, 1})
randomly and independently of Alice. Then, he inputs
Alice’s and his states into a black box to perform a Bell
state measurement (BSM) that projects |φα,a〉 and |φβ,b〉
into a Bell state (see Fig. 1). If the BSM does not ob-
tain a Bell state, then the black box outputs a ”failure”
click. Bob now will ask Alice to restart step 1. Other-
wise, Bob records the corresponding result. Bob needs
only to identify Bell states |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉), im-
plying the black box can only use linear optical elements.
Theoretical probabilities of the outcomes |Ψ±〉 for differ-
ent combinations of |φα,a〉 and |φβ,b〉 are shown in Table
I.
3. Bob sends Alice a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Alice reveals {α, a}.
5. Bob compares {α, a} and {β, b} with the cells in
Table I. If the combination of {α, a} and {β, b} corre-
sponds to the cell with probability 0, then Bob detects
Alice cheating and aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the
outcome of the coin value is x = a⊕ b′.
Furthermore, because Bob does not need to protect the
BSM from unwanted leakage of classical information to
the outside, we can permit an agent of Bob performing
the BSM in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the secure
transmission distance of MDI-QCT will be doubled.
The reasons that MDI-QCT is loss tolerant with single-
photon source are explained as follows. First, MDI-QCT
is a bit-commitment-based QCT protocol, and Alice par-
tially commits to either a = 0 or a = 1 at step 1. The
density matrices that correspond to Alice’s partial com-
mitments are the same with BBBG09. Thus, as proved
in [22], Bob cannot through the UD or MCD to obtain
a better discrimination of Alice’s commitment than the
MED.
Second, since Alice can fabricate the measurement de-
vice, the black box has the chance to discriminate the
four honest states randomly sent by Bob and announce
the result to Alice. The discrimination processes of the
four states can be regarded as the following form math-
ematically. Bob sends the black box a photon which is
prepared with the same prior probability 14 in one of the
4 given honest states. Thus, the density operator of the
state received by the box is
ρ =
1
4
4∑
i=1
ρi =
I
2
, (2)
where I is the identity operator in two-dimensional
Hilbert space, ρ1 = |φ0,0〉〈φ0,0|, ρ2 = |φ0,1〉〈φ0,1|, ρ3 =
|φ1,0〉〈φ1,0|, and ρ4 = |φ1,1〉〈φ1,1|. Discriminating multi-
ple states is a nontrivial task. However, the four honest
states are linearly dependent, which implies that the UD
does not apply here [30]. On the other hand, Eq. (2)
implies that the the identity operator can be resolved as
a weighted sum over the density operators ρi. It follows
from the Ref. [31] that the MCD of the four honest states
can be done without inconclusive results, namely, the
MCD coincides with the MED and the maximal guessing
probability can not be increased by admitting inconclu-
sive results. Therefore, neither Bob nor Alice could in-
crease his/her bias by UD and MCD due to the inevitable
losses in practical implementation.
III. SECURITY OF MDI-QCT
In this section, we discuss the correctness and secu-
rity of the proposed protocol. For the correctness, we
estimate the honest abort probability. For the security,
we calculate each party’s maximal cheating probability
and the coefficients of the states in Eq. (1) to make the
protocol fair.
A. Honest abort probability
Like practical QKD systems, MDI-QCT inevitably will
suffer from imperfections in the real world. As suggested
in [18], to make the protocol allow some amount of noise
Alice Bob
State
preparation
State
preparation
Ψ
+ Ψ
-
Black box
Failure
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram of MDI-QCT. Here,
Alice and Bob prepare, e.g., polarization states as Eq. (1) ran-
domly using single-photon sources. Bob performs the BSM
through the black box, which may be fabricated by Alice. The
three outputs |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉 and ”failure” of the black box repre-
sent the results of the BSM. If the output ”failure” clicks, Bob
will request Alice to restart the protocol. The red dotted box
surrounding Bob’s source implies that the black box cannot
obtain the classical information about Bob’s state prepara-
tion.
4TABLE I. Theoretical probabilities of Bell states |Ψ±〉 for different combinations of |φα,a〉 and |φβ,b〉. These can be calculated
by the interferences of the honest states at the beam splitter.
|Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
(a) |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉 (b) |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
|φ0,0〉 2y(1− y) 12 (1− 2y)2 0 12 |φ0,0〉 0 12 2y(1− y) 12 (2y − 1)2
|φ0,1〉 12 (1− 2y)2 2y(1− y) 12 0 |φ0,1〉 12 0 12 (2y − 1)2 2y(1− y)
|φ1,0〉 0 12 2y(1− y) 12 (2y − 1)2 |φ1,0〉 2y(1− y) 12 (1− 2y)2 0 12
|φ1,1〉 12 0 12 (2y − 1)2 2y(1− y) |φ1,1〉 12 (1− 2y)2 2y(1− y) 12 0
in the state preparation, transmission and detection pro-
cesses, the players will abort with some probability when
both of them are honest. For MDI-QCT is loss-tolerant
when both parties use single-photon state sources, there
is always a successful BSM result. In its simplest case,
we also have required that Alice and Bob perfectly char-
acterize their encoded quantum states. And we could at-
tribute the noise in transmission lines to the dark counts
of the detectors. With these simplification, the honest
parties will abort in the situation that the first success-
ful BSM is due to dark counts. Because both parties
now are honest, we can describe the BSM specifically as
shown in Fig. 2. If the projection of BSM is |Ψ+〉, Bob
will abort with probability 14 , since Alice and Bob pre-
pare the states randomly and there are four cells with
probability 0 in Table I for |Ψ+〉. The abort probabil-
ity is same for projection |Ψ−〉. Here, we assume the
four single-photon detectors in the BSM have identical
properties. The total honest abort probability is
PrH =2 · 1
4
[(1− tA)(1 − tB) · 2d2 + tA(1− tB)η · d+
tB(1− tA)η · d+ tA(1− tB)(1 − η) · 2d2 +
tB(1− tA)(1 − η) · 2d2 + tAtB(1− η)2 · 2d2] (3)
where d is the dark count rate and η is the quantum effi-
ciency of the detector; tA = 10
−0.02lA and tB = 10−0.02lB
are the lA and lB lengths (km) channel transmittance of
Alice’s and Bob’s fiber, respectively; here, we let the loss
coefficient in the fiber be 0.2dB/km. Note, we have omit-
ted the factor (1− d)2 ∼ 1, which implies that the other
two detectors do not click in order to obtain a successful
projection.
The relationship between the honest abort probability
and the transmission distance is plotted in Fig. 3. At a
shorter distance, less than 20km in the figure, the case
that a photon and a dark counts lead to a BSM result
is more likely. However, at a longer distance, the prob-
ability that a BSM projection is completely due to dark
counts increases. From Fig. 3 we can see that the coin-
cidence detections of the BSM make our protocol more
robust against the detector dark counts.
B. Dishonest Bob’s maximal cheating probability
Assume that Bob tries to bias the coin towards the
value x = 0 (the analysis for x = 1 is similar because the
protocol is symmetric). We also suppose that the condi-
tions are all in favor of a dishonest Bob, i.e., the channels
are perfect and Bob’s detectors are perfect. These only
maximize Bob’s cheating probability.
The optimal cheating strategy of a malicious Bob is
to perform an optimal measurement to discriminate the
received states sent by honest Alice, i.e., to obtain a.
Then, Bob can decide the value of random bit b′ in step
3 to obtain his desired coin’s outcome. As the honest
states sent by Alice are no different in form from those in
BBBG09 [22], dishonest Bob’s optimal cheating strategy
is the same as theirs. For the case where honest Al-
ice uses a single-photon source, Bob’s maximal cheating
probability is PrB[x] = y [22].
In the above cheating strategy, a dishonest Bob will
deviate the MDI-protocol to obtain a maximal cheating
probability. However, our protocol is designed only to
protect an honest Bob, thus it is no matter that the ad-
vantage of the MDI paradigm does not exists for a dis-
honest Bob.
Alice Bob
State
preparation
State
preparation
BS
PBSPBS
D1H D2HD2VD1V
BSM
FIG. 2. (Color online) Schematic diagram of MDI-QCT when
both parties are honest. Here, BS stands for 50:50 beam split-
ter and PBS stands for polarization beam splitter. Alice and
Bob prepare polarization states as Eq. (1) randomly using
single-photon sources. Bob performs the BSM and records
the results for the verification of Alice’s honesty. A joint click
on D1H and D2V , or D1V and D2H , represents a projection
into Bell state |Ψ−〉. And a joint click on D1H and D1V , or
D2H and D2V , represents a projection into Bell state |Ψ+〉.
5C. Dishonest Alice’s maximal cheating probability
Assume that Alice tries to bias the coin towards the
value x = 0 (the analysis for x = 1 is similar because the
protocol is symmetric). In the following, we assume that
Alice builds the measurement device which contains her
cheating device, and gives it to Bob. Bob only needs to
protect the classical information of his state preparation
from leakage to the untrusted measurement device and
Alice. Thus, the black box cannot access Bob’s classi-
cal information used to prepare quantum states. On the
other hand, the outcome of the BSM cannot reveal Bob’s
quantum state with certainty. Therefore, we can let the
black box send classical information to Alice, which can
be simply done by classical communication device im-
planted into the black box beforehand. We also assume
that the detectors and both parties’ single-photon sources
are perfect, and the channel is lossless. All these will
maximize Alice’s cheating probability. Therefore, the
protocol can be modified as follows. First, Bob ran-
domly sends the state |φβ,b〉 to the measurement black
box. Then the black box does the cheating strategy of
Alice and announces a result of |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉 or failure to
both parties correspondingly. The black box can also
send other classical information to Alice. The remaining
steps are the same with steps 3, 4 and 5 in the honest
MDI-QCT.
Based on the above modified protocol, we first intro-
duce an individual attack where Alice places a measure-
ment device to discriminate Bob’s state in the black box.
Now, Alice does not send any state in step 2. The box
will send the discrimination result to Alice and output
a BSM projection randomly to both parties. Once the
Transmission distance L [km]
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Relationship between the honest abort
probability and the transmission distance. The quantum effi-
ciency η of the detector is made 10%. The dark count rate d
is 10−4, which is higher than the usual case because we have
attributed the noise in transmission lines to dark counts. For
simplification, we make lA = lB = L.
box correctly discriminates Bob’s state, then after step
3, Alice can reveal appropriate {α, a} according to Table
I and b′ to obtain her desired coin’s value without being
caught cheating. The four states randomly sent by hon-
est Bob are pairs of two orthogonal states with the same
prior probability 14 . As proven in Ref. [32], the guessing
probability of the MED is 12 . On the other hand, her
discrimination has an error rate of 12 . As from her point
of view, Alice can not determine whether the result of
the MED is wrong. Thus, in this time, the probability
of her choice of {α, a} passing Bob’s test is 12 , for there
are two states |φβ,b〉 in Table I that will make Alice pass
the verification and each has a probability 14 . To sum
up, she can bias the coin in the individual attack with
probability PrindA [x] =
1
2 +
1
2 · 12 = 34 .
In the following we discuss a coherent attack. The
success of Alice’s cheating should satisfy two conditions.
One is that the combination of the result of the BSM and
their states must pass Bob’s verification at the last step.
The other is that the coin’s value is her desired one. Note
that the second one can always be satisfied because in the
protocol Alice will announce her state only after Bob has
told a random bit b′. That is to say, Alice only has to
try her best to pass Bob’s verification via the operations
in the measurement black box. Here, we assume Alice
always let the black box do BSM. In the following, we
calculate Alice’s maximal cheating probability under a
coherent attack with this assumption.
Considering the MLC [3–5] no-go theorem, the gen-
eral optimal cheating strategy for a dishonest Alice is an
optimal coherent attack. Specifically, Alice submits to
Bob one half of an entangled state, which will maximize
her probability of passing Bob’s test. However, because
MDI-QCT is a bit-commitment-based QCT protocol, the
pioneering work of Spekkens and Rudolph [8], which gives
a thorough investigation of the optimal coherent attack
on bit-commitment-based quantum cryptography tasks,
applies here.
In MDI-QCT, two honest pure states |φα,0〉 correspond
to Alice’s committed bit 0 and two honest pure states
|φα,1〉 correspond to Alice’s committed bit 1. This con-
figuration agrees with case 1 of section 6.4.1 in [8]. Hence,
there are three optimal states for Alice to submit to Bob
in step 1 of the protocol: the first is |+〉, which has equal
trace distance [33] with |φ0,0〉 and |φ1,1〉; the second is
|−〉, which has equal trace distance with |φ0,1〉 and |φ1,0〉;
and the third is any mixture of the states |+〉 and |−〉,
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉). Now, Alice does not need pre-
pare an entangled state. Because all the optimal states
lead to a same maximal cheating probability, here we
take the state |+〉 for illustration. The probabilities for
states |+〉 (or |−〉) and |φβ,b〉 being projected into Bell
states |Ψ±〉 are shown in Table II.
In the following, we calculate the maximal probability
that Alice can force the coin towards 0 with optimal state
|+〉. We will suppose that the conditions are all in favor of
a dishonest Alice, i.e., the channels and the detectors are
perfect and the classical information of the BSM is leaked
6to herself. After step 3, Alice will reveal state (α = b′, a =
b′) to Bob. Now, we should find the probability that
the combinations of (α = b′, a = b′) and (β, b) fall into
the cells corresponding to probability 0 in Table I, i.e.,
only when Alice will be caught cheating. There are four
cases of the combinations: the first two are {(α = 0, a =
0), (β = 1, b = 0)} and {(α = 1, a = 1), (β = 0, b = 1)}
for outcome |Ψ+〉; the last two are {(α = 0, a = 0), (β =
0, b = 0)} and {(α = 1, a = 1), (β = 1, b = 1)} for
outcome |Ψ−〉. As shown in Table II, the probabilities
of the four cases, where Alice’s states are replaced by
the real sent state |+〉, are all 1−2
√
y(1−y)
2 . Because Bob
prepares his states randomly and independently of Alice,
and he selects b′ randomly, Alice can bias the coin with
probability:
PrcohA [x] =1−
1
2
· 1
4
· 1− 2
√
y(1− y)
2
· 2−
1
2
· 1
4
· 1− 2
√
y(1− y)
2
· 2
=
3 + 2
√
y(1− y)
4
, (4)
which is same as with BBBG09 [22].
At last, we calculate the coefficients of the states in
Eq. (1) to make the protocol fair. For the purpose of
fairness, let PrcohA [x] = PrB[x]; thus, we have y = 0.9
for the state preparation and basis choice processes of
the MDI-QCT protocol when each party uses a single-
photon source. We can calculate the values
εA = εB = 0.4,
which implies the bias of loss-tolerant MDI-QCT is 0.4
under this coherent attack. This value is the same with
BBBG09.
IV. MDI-QCT FOR WEAK COHERENT STATE
SOURCE
In practical quantum cryptography system, because a
perfect single-photon source is beyond the state-of-the-
art technology, a weak coherent state source is widely
used. To implement the MDI-QCT protocol with a weak
coherent state source and avoid the multi-photon security
loophole as noted in [22], we can utilize the technique
in PCDK11. Namely, Alice sends a fixed number K of
pulses in step 1, where K is determined by the security
analysis. If none of the BSM in step 2 is successful, Bob
aborts. Otherwise, let j label the first identified Bell
state, which Bob will tell Alice in step 3. The rest of
the protocol remains the same, except that the values
of {α, a, β, b} are all labeled by the index j. Obviously,
using this technique comes with a price, i.e., the protocol
now is not completely impervious to losses.
The security of MDI-QCT with weak coherent state
source is the same with its single-photon source counter-
part when Alice is dishonest. As for a malicious Bob,
his maximal cheating probability is changed because of
the multi-photon pulses emitted by the weak coherent
state source. Fortunately, the calculation has been done
in [25]. Therefore, one can use the result in [25] to obtain
the value of y and K.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, some side channel (including source [34]
and detector) attacks presented in practical QKD can
also arise in other practical quantum cryptographic tasks
with mistrustful parties. In this paper, we have proposed
MDI-QCT to remove all the detector side-channels in
practical QCT. Our results suggest that the idea in MDI-
QKD can also be applied to QCT, as well as other quan-
tum cryptographic tasks based on QCT, e.g., two-party
secure computation. Thus we extend the scope of the
skill of MDI-QKD into a very rich field. Furthermore,
our protocol can increase the transmission distance if we
permit an agent of Bob to perform the BSM in the middle
of Alice and Bob.
We have already proven the security of MDI-QCT
against a dishonest Alice under a coherent attack, which
is probably the optimal coherent attack because of the
work of Ref. [8]. It is interesting to have a more gen-
eral security analysis in the future. Another theoretic
research needed is to combine the source flaws into se-
curity analysis. Because in MDI-QCT, we have assumed
that Alice’s and Bob’s sources can be trusted. It should
examine this condition carefully in practice.
In the experiments, MDI-QCT can be implemented
with a weak coherent state source. The platforms for the
implementation of MDI-QKD [35–40] can also be used
here with several modifications. Thus, we expect MDI-
QCT to be widely utilized in practical QCT systems in
the future.
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7TABLE II. Theoretical probabilities of Bell states |Ψ±〉 for Alice’s coherent cheating strategy. The probabilities have been
normalized, for the result of BSM is either |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉 if the step 2 succeeds.
|Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
(a) |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉 (b) |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
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√
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2
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√
y(1−y)
2
1−2
√
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2
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√
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√
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√
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√
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√
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2
|−〉 1−2
√
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√
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√
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2
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√
y(1−y)
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√
y(1−y)
2
1−2
√
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√
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√
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